Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players o er a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) o ers are systematically rejected. We o er an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the assumption that players behave rationally for given preferences but that their preferences change through an evolutionary process. We prove that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing unfair o ers is an evolutionarily successful strategy if players interact in groups. This leads players to split the resource equally almost always. However, the equal split is not due to 'true fairness' (or 'altruism') but is entirely caused by the (justi ed) fear that unfair o ers might be rejected. Our result can be interpreted as presenting an evolutionary foundation for the emergence of social norms. JEL{ classi cation numbers: C73, D 83.
Introduction
Experimental results on the ultimatum game (see for surveys Thaler, 1988 or Roth, 1995) show clearly that (1) large fractions of players o er a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair, though positive, o ers are systematically rejected. Relying on three former studies 1 Harrison and McCabe (1992) computed overall distributions of o ers in terms of percentages and the according rejection rates. They show that 43% of all proposers o ered an equal split, while more than 52% of proposals o ering less than a quarter of the resource ('cake') were rejected. Until now these deviations from the game theoretic prediction have remained a puzzle to theorists provoking numerous attempts to resolve it.
Several lines of arguments have been discussed in the literature. The two main approaches can be roughly classi ed into those based on reputation and those based on norms, envy or fairness considerations. It is obvious that reputation e ects may yield the results described above if the game is played repeatedly with the same opponent. However, the experimental results hold even for one{time and/or anonymous interaction (see Bolton and Zwick, 1995) when reputation e ects can be avoided by careful experimental designs.
The second approach can easily be integrated into the traditional neoclassical framework by simply including 'fairness' or 'envy' parameters into the utility function. Due to the tautological nature of this maneuver one ": : :would be guilty of the unlikely crime of saying something without operational content" (Binmore, 1994, p. 19) as it explains everything and yet nothing unless one is able to specify why individuals would have such preferences.
An important step in this direction presents the so{called 'indirect evolutionary approach', rst proposed by G uth and Yaari (1992) , which provides an evolutionary foundation for preferences and follows thereby a suggestion rst made by Becker (1976) . 2 The indirect evolutionary approach is based on the assumption that players behave rationally for given preferences but that their preferences change through an evolutionary process. In particular, we assume that the evolution of certain preference parameters in the population depends on the relative success of individuals endowed with these preferences. While preferences might be inherited literally in a genetical sense, we prefer to think of it in terms of social evolution since preferences and value judgements of children are predominantly shaped by taking their parents or peers as role models. 3 In our view, this approach ts better the situation encountered in experiments than the usual (direct) evolutionary approach, which operates on strategies rather than preferences. Most experimental subjects when entering a lab would insist that they are being rational given their preferences rather than being programmed to choose certain actions. We model a mini ultimatum game (as in Gale, Binmore and Samuelson, 1995) , which retains all important strategic features of the full ultimatum game while being considerably simpler to analyze. 4 A mini ultimatum game di ers from the ultimatum game by giving the proposers only two options:
either o er a 50:50 split or o er " to the other player and keep the rest. We consider a population in which players are repeatedly matched to play this game, once in the role of proposer and once in the role of responder. There are two types of players. The rst type is only interested in his physical payo . The second type is interested additionally in being treated "fairly" (but not in treating others fairly). The latter type may take 'revenge' by rejecting grossly unfair o ers 5 .
The key question is now whether individuals of the revengeful type are evolutionarily successful. At rst this seems unlikely since an individual gives up resources when rejecting unfair o ers and receives only subjective utility which does not enter his tness function. Although all responders would pro t from punishing unfair o ers, no one is willing to do so. As Axelrod (1986, p. 1100) puts it "a sad but stable state" prevails. G uth a very similar framework. Note that there have also been former studies relying on a similar framework without explicating it as principle. Interestingly, these studies (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1990, Easley 1992 and are all concerned with nancial markets where the type spaces in the evolutionary parts of the models are de ned by behavioral patterns.
and Yaari (1992) solve this problem by assuming that players are able to recognize the preferences of their opponents which in our case would, of course, lead all proposers to o er the fair division if they are matched with a revengeful responder. While this assumption might be justi ed in some cases (see Frank, 1988) , we believe that in most cases players will not be able to know their opponents type, in particular since all responders have an incentive to mimic the revengeful types. Consequently, we will present a model with anonymous interaction (so that reputation e ects can play no role) and with incomplete information of players regarding their opponents' types.
We show that a quite general stochastic evolutionary process leads under some plausible assumptions to all players sharing the resource equally almost always. We do not assume that players who are revengeful if in the role of responder behave in any way fairer if in the role of the proposer (this would only strengthen our results). Instead, the equal splits are entirely due to the (justi ed) fear of being rejected if the proportion of revengeful players becomes too high. Thus, the population may look as if all players are driven by the norm Share equally! Interestingly, there is no kind of altruism involved in the model: As Bolton (1991) suggests, players who have a preference for relative money care only for their share; they do not su er when they themselves get more than half the resource.
Contrary to intuition our result implies that punishment (or vengefulness) can be evolutionarily successful even though those who punish lose resources. There are three main features of our model that drive this result. The rst is the straightforward assumption that evolutionary success is based on relative tness. The second is the assumption that players change roles. Without this it would never be evolutionary successful for responders in an anonymous setting to reject unfair o ers. And, nally, we assume that players interact in groups. This assumption is necessary because it is only possible to introduce a new way of playing the game if the group that innovates is su ciently small. 6 We like this assumption for two reasons. First we believe it to be realistic that players do not interact with everyone in the entire population. And second, it emphasizes the importance of groups size for the sustainability of cooperation. Casual empiricism seems to suggest that cooperation breaks down if groups become too large.
Since the indirect evolutionary approach has two stages, we organize our paper accordingly. Section 2 introduces the rst stage of the approach, the basic game, in which we describe the mini ultimatum game and solve for (perfect) equilibrium behavior for given preferences. Section 3 analyses the evolutionary dynamics based on the outcomes (payo s) resulting from the rst stage. In Section 4 we comment on the distinction between the direct and the indirect evolutionary approach, and Section 5 adds some nal remarks For precise de nitions and proofs see the appendix. 2 The basic model
The game
We study a mini-ultimatum game with the following rules: The proposer has to suggest how a given resource r (which we normalize to 2) shall be allocated among proposer and responder. Let r kh denote the absolute share of the resource which proposer k claims for himself when he plays against h. In order to keep the analysis simple while retaining the main strategic aspects of the full ultimatum game, only two moves are allowed for the
proposer. An egoistic o er (move E) with r kh = 2?", where " is the smallest unit of the resource (" < 1), and a fair o er (move F) with r kh = 1. The responder h can either accept ( kh = 1) or reject ( kh = 0) k's proposal.
If he accepts, the resource is allocated according to the suggestion of the proposer; if he rejects, both get nothing.
Utility functions
Players derive subjective utility from the allocation of resources. We assume that two species of players are possible: The rst type, A, is only interested in his absolute share of the resource. Accordingly, we know that players of type A will accept both possible o ers whereas players of type B will only accept r kh = 1. 8 Decisions of proposers will obviously depend on their beliefs about the distribution of the two types among their possible opponents.
The population
We assume that the population is nite and is partitioned into various groups of players. The number of players in the total population is denoted by N and is assumed to be xed. However, the number of players in a group may vary over time. Let N t i denote the number of players in group i at time t:
To exclude the case that the entire population is collected in a single group, we restrict the capacity of a group to N ? 1: That is, there are always at least two non-empty groups. Let n t ij denote the number of type{j players in group i at time t; j 2 fA; Bg. The state of the system at time t is completely speci ed by a matrix n t := (n t ij ) i=1;:::N;j2fA;Bg ; where t = 1; 2::: measures discrete time. 9 Let denote the nite state space. Each player is being matched twice against all other players in his group in a round robin fashion { once in the role of the proposer and once in the role of the responder. Thus, in period t every individual in group i plays the game 2(N t i ? 1) times.
Payo s
The (material) payo s of a player k in group i at time t is simply the average amount of the resources consumed in that period. It is derived from (N t i ?1) 7 Our results do not depend on the exact form of the utility function as long as uk(rk ) is monotonically increasing in rk and the type-B responders receive extra utility from rejecting o er E. We assume linearity only for notational simplicity 8 Thus, an alternative interpretation of our model is that subjects' utility depends on relative income (Bolton, 1991) since the B{type responders prefer the allocation (0; 0) to (2 ? "; "). Thus, B{types accord with the punishment hypothesis of Bolton and Zwick (1995) . 9 We incur no loss in generality by restricting the number of groups to N: encounters with all other members of his group as proposer and (N t i ? 1) encounters as responder and is given by 
Behavior and consequences
As explained above, the key premise of the indirect evolutionary approach is that individuals behave rationally in each period given their preferences. Their preferences, however, are shaped through an evolutionary process, which is related to the payo their strategy achieved in the previous period. In each given period the optimal choice of a proposer depends only on his beliefs about the distribution of A{ and B{types in his group. We assume that the composition of a particular group is known to all its members, i.e.
(n t iA ; n t iB ) is known to all players in group i at all times. Furthermore we assume that players x their actions in one period. 10 Knowing that A{players accept all o ers whereas B{players accept only fair o ers (F), the fair o er F is an optimal action for an A{player belonging to group i if (2 ? ") n iA ? 1 N i ? 1 1
(1) otherwise he will choose E. For a B{player belonging to group i the fair o er F is optimal if (2 ? ") n iA N i ? 1 1
In case the proposer is indi erent between E and F we assume that he chooses the fair o er. Using conditions (1) and (2) we can then distinguish three cases: 3 The evolutionary process
We can now turn to the speci cation of the process which determines the evolution of preferences in the population. We assume a quite general process. Before describing this process in detail let us consider the following simple motivation. Suppose at the end of each period all individuals die. Their genes (and, therefore, their revenge parameters j ) are inherited by their o spring. We assume that there are just enough resources to keep the size of the total population, N; xed; only the distribution of types and the size of the di erent groups change. Since all individuals are involved in a ght for the same resources, payo s of individuals are compared across the entire population. We then make the straightforward assumption that individuals with higher (material) payo s have a higher number of o spring. Of course, the assumption that all individuals die after each period is not required. What is su cient is a certain monotonicity assumption. An assumption which is frequently used in the literature (see Nachbar, 1990; Friedman, 1991; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992 ; Vega-Redondo, 1994) is monotonicity. 11 It states that the growth rate of some pure strategy S is larger than the growth rate of S 0 if and only if S has the higher payo . Note that the well known replicator dynamics are a special case of the monotonic dynamics, in which the growth rate of strategy S is equal to the di erence between the payo of S and the population average payo (see e.g. Weibull, 1995) .
We will use a slightly weaker assumption here in that we do not constrain the relative growth rates of types with the same payo . A suitable adaptation of the above concept to our discrete time and nite state framework yields then the following assumption. Let b n t ij := 8 < :
n t+1 ij ?n t ij n t ij if n t ij > 0 0 else be the growth rate of type j in group i at time t.
Assumption 1 The evolutionary process can be described by a Markov process with transition matrix P(0) = (p nn 0 (0)) n;n 0 2 which satis es the following condition. Let n t = n and n t+1 = n 0 ; then: We call P(0) the unperturbed Markov process for reasons that will become clear immediately. Note that Assumption 1 implies that the process reaches an absorbing state if the payo s of all individuals are equal. This seems to be a plausible assumption because evolutionary selection pressure disappears when all individuals reveive the same payo . Assumption 1 describes two important aspects of evolution, namely selection and replication. We add now the third ingredient to evolution by de ning a mutation process, which when taken together with the selection process yields the perturbed Markov process P( ), where is the mutation rate. Suppose that the characteristics of an individual (i.e. his revenge parameter and his group membership) are inherited by his descendants with probability less than one. With strictly positive probability an individual changes his type and/or group. Assumption 2 (Mutations) At the end of each period the characteristics of each individual change with probability ij > 0; 8i; j; and P ij ij = 1; ij 2 (0; 1); whereby an individual of type j 0 in group i 0 becomes a j-type in group i.
Note that the exact speci cation of the weights ij in the mutation process is unimportant as long as the mutation process is independent of the state and has full support. 12 We can now state the main result of the paper. The proof and all formal de nitions are relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for arbitrary initial conditions the fair o er F followed by acceptance through the responder will be observed almost always in the long run as ! 0:
Note that almost all proposers will o er the fair split despite the fact that not necessarily all responders are of the 'revengeful' type B. It is su cient that the proportion of revengeful types in each group is high enough to make unfair o ers unpro table.
4 On the di erence between the direct and the indirect evolutionary approach
The standard approach in evolutionary game theory or biology is the direct approach, in which players (animals) are genetically programmed to behave in a certain way. In the language of game theory each player is endowed with a particular strategy which cannot be changed during the game. Since evolution can hardly account for all eventualities, these strategies are usually assumed to be of a simple kind, in fact, they are generally assumed to prescribe a simple action. In this sense the key di erence between the direct and the indirect evolutionary approach is that in the direct approach the player is programmed to use a given action whereas in the indirect approach a player can react rationally to the environment, that is, he can condition his behavior on the state of the system. 13 In our framework the direct approach would allow for four possible strategies (assuming that a fair o er is always accepted): (1) Make the fair o er if in the role of the proposer and accept only fair o ers when in the role of the responder. (2) Make the fair o er but accept all o ers. (3) Make the 12 See Bergin and Lipman (1993) for the consequences of state-dependent mutations. 13 Note that this distinction is one of degree rather than of kind as one could always imagine that players in the direct approach are endowed with a fully contingent strategy. The question is, however, whether evolution could produce the required huge variety of genetical programs in any reasonable time span.
unfair o er and accept all o ers. And (4) make the unfair o er but accept only fair o ers.
It is fairly easy to see that the direct approach produces the opposite result of the indirect approach, namely, that the unfair o er will be observed almost always. Consider an absorbing state in which all players use strategy (1). The fair o er is enforced by the e ective threat that unfair o ers are rejected. However, a mutant playing strategy (2) can enter without being exposed to any selection pressure. As soon as enough mutants have entered, mutants playing strategy (3) can enter and they will receive a higher payo than both other types. Thus, the system can drift away to a state in which all players use strategy (3).
This latter state is stable as it takes at least two mutations to switch one of the groups back to one in which fair o ers are being made. 14 One mutant playing strategy (4) is required to push the system out of the absorbing state. If the group is small, players of type (4) will get a higher payo than those of type (3) . Once the number of the type (4) players is su ciently high, it takes another mutant (playing strategy (1) or (2)) to reach an absorbing state in which everyone make the fair o er. This is in contrast to the indirect approach where this last mutation is not required. The direct evolutionary approach, therefore, is not able to explain the experimental results on the ultimatum game.
Final remarks
The main message of this study is that fairness in the ultimatum game can be evolutionarily stable without any institutions enforcing it despite the fact that interaction is anonymous. Of course, punishing others is always costly in absolute terms. However, it may improve the relative payo of those who punish, and since evolutionary forces rely on relative payo s a preference for punishment can be stable. Our results can be interpreted as presenting an explanation for the emergence of social norms in the absence of any kind of altruism but also as giving a theoretical foundation for preferences relying on both, absolute and relative income as suggested by Bolton (1991) to explain experimental data. 14 Using the terminology introduced in the appendix states with players only of type (3) form a mutation connected component. Another mutation connected component consists of states in which all players are either of type (1) or (2). The result follows as it takes at least two mutations to reach the latter component from the former but only one in the opposite direction.
The predictions of our model accord remarkedly well with the experimental evidence. A key assumption of our model was that proposers in general make the fair o er not because of true fairness considerations but rather because of the the fear of being rejected by revengful responders. This assumption is supported convincingly by Bolton and Zwick (1995) in an experiment. Based on this hypothesis our model is able to explain why a signi cant number of players reject small but positive o ers.
The results are driven mainly by three assumptions, which we hope to relax in future work. The rst is that players change roles, i.e. sometimes they are proposers and sometimes they are responders. Upon re ection it should be clear that this assumption will be the most di cult to relax since an individual responder will never be able to recoup his 'investment' (by punishing low o ers) which bene ts all responders but yields little in terms of payo s for an individual.
The other two key assumptions are that interaction takes place in groups and that individuals know the composition of their group at every time. Though we like the general avor of both assumptions, they are arguably stronger than required. We have already explored ways to relax the third assumption, namely to assume that instead of knowing the true distribution of types in their group players only have beliefs about it, which are monotonic functions of the true distribution on the same support. Second, we could allow that subjects at time t only know the composition of their group at t?1. Both alternative assumptions only slow down the evolutionary process and will not change the general result of the paper.
Two extensions which we plan to pursue in future studies are the following. First, it would be interesting to analyze the evolutionary process when subjects have information only about past actions of players in their group rather than about strategies (and therefore about underlying preferences). This issue is closely related to learning in extensive form games (see Fudenberg and Kreps, 1988; Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; and N oldeke and Samuelson, 1993 
Appendix
Recall that a state n t = (n t ij ) i=1;:::;N;j2fA;Bg speci es the number of players of each type in each group at time t. Let denote the state space. Since N is nite, is nite too. The composition of the evolutionary dynamics as described by Assumptions 1 and the mutation process as speci ed by Assumption 2 yield a nite Markov chain ( ; P( )), with transition matrix P( ) = (p nn 0 ( )): The element p nn 0 of this matrix represents the transition probability Prob(n t+1 = n 0 j n t = n). The transition matrix P(0) corresponds to the dynamics without mutations.
Let ( ) := ( n ( )) n2 2 4 j j?1 denote a probability distribution on the j j ? 1 dimensional simplex, with j j being the number of elements in : ( ) is said to be invariant (or stationary) if
Due to the assumed mutation process the Markov chain ( ; P( )) is irreducible, i.e. it moves from any state to any other state with strictly positive We can thus say that ( ) summarizes the long run behavior of the evolutionary process in the sense that for any initial condition the empirical frequencies over the states of converge to ( ) with probability one. It is standard to consider the limit invariant distribution, which describes the behavior of the process in the limit as the probability of mutations approaches zero. := lim !0 ( ):
The set of long run states is the support of ; supp( ) := fn 2 j n > 0g : Since both, ( ) and P( ) are continuous we can take limits on both sides of (6) Let p m nn 0 (0) = Prob(n t+m = n 0 j n t = n) be the probability that the process without mutations moves from n to n 0 in m steps.
De nition 2 The basin of attraction of an absorbing state n 0 of ( ; P(0)) is the set B(n 0 ) = fn 2 ; n 6 = n 0 j 9m s:t: p m nn 0 (0) > 0g :
By Lemma 1 all long run states must belong to some absorbing set. Next, we can classify the absorbing states of our game.
Let C denote the set of states in which in all non{empty groups (1) there are at least two players, and (2) either the number of B-types is zero or n iB (1?")N i +1 2?" : Note that in the latter case the group belongs to case 1 from Section 2.5, which implies that all proposers make the fair o er F. Of particular interest is the set of states in which the proposers in all groups o er the fair division (and, of course, all proposers accept). We denote this set by C 0 C: In the following we will often speak of pure A-groups if a group contains only individuals of type A and of F{groups if all proposers in that group choose to split fairly (that is, if the group belongs to case 1).
An absorbing state is called trivial if either all groups have just a single member 17 or if the state is absorbing only because of the capacity constraint of N ?1 on group size. Let T be the set of all such states and let X := C T . Lemma 2 The set of non-trivial absorbing states of P(0) is equal to C.
Proof Note rst that in all states n 2 C all individuals have the same payo . By Assumption 1 they are therefore (non{trivial) absorbing states.
What remains to show is that all non-trivial absorbing states belong to C: Assume to the contrary that there exists a non-trivial absorbing state n 0 not belonging to C. Since n 0 = 2 C either there exists a group with only one member or there exists a group in which (1?")N i +1
2?" > n iB > 0: If in n 0 there is a group with a single member, his payo is zero, which is lower than that of any individual in groups with more than one member. Since by Assumption 1 a state is a non{trivial absorbing state only if all individuals have the same payo , n 0 cannot be a non-trivial absorbing state.
On the other hand, if (1?")N i +1
2?" > n iB > 0 in some group i; that is, if case 2 or case 3 as de ned in Section 2.5 hold, then it is easy to see that iA 6 = iB . 18 Again this implies that n 0 cannot be a non{trivial absorbing state.
For reasons that will become clear later we partition the set C into classes C v as follows. All non{trivial absorbing states with only two non{ empty groups belong to class C v . The remaining absorbing states in C are classi ed as follows. Two states n and n 0 with more than two non{empty groups belong to the same class C v ; v 6 = v ; if and only if for all i; group i is either empty in both states or an F{group in both states or an A{ group in both states. A typical vector v characterizing C v is an N{tuple (A; ;; ;; F; F; A; :::); where the groups have been assigned an arbitrary but xed ordering 1; :::; N:
Lemma 3 All absorbing sets of ( ; P(0)) are singletons. Proof We will show that from all non{absorbing states there exists a chain of transitions with strictly positive probability to some absorbing state, which implies that all non{absorbing states are transitory and therefore cannot belong to an absorbing set (like e.g. a limit cycle).
Fix any non{absorbing state n. Since n is non{absorbing there exists a group i such that ij 6 = i 0 j 0 . Consider now a transition to some state n 0 6 = n such that ij = min hk hk < max hk hk =) n 0 ij = 0 According to Assumption 1 this transition to n 0 occurs with strictly positive probability. Since is nite, the process must reach upon nite repetition of this step a state, in which the payo of all individuals is equal. By Assumption 1 this state must be absorbing.
The following concept, which was rst introduced by N oldeke and Samuelson (1993) and Samuelson (1994) , will prove to be useful in the following. 18 To be precise, if Ni happens to be excactly 2 " in all non-empty groups, there is another type of absorbing states since in this knife-edge situation iA = iB in case (3). We will disregard these absorbing states in the following since it is easy to see that they are not robust once we introduce mutations.
De nition 3 A mutation connected component is a set of absorbing states such that (1) for all n; n 0 2 , there exists a sequence of elements of connecting n and n 0 with the property that all transitions involve exactly one mutation and (2) (4) , (1 + Therefore it either takes at least two mutations to reach a state in n 2 C v from any state n 0 2 C v 0 or vice versa, which implies that n and n 0 do not belong to the same mutation connected component.
Finally consider any n 2 C v . We can construct a series of one-mutations transitions to any other state n 0 2 C v by rst moving to a state in which N ? 1 players are collected in one group. This state is absorbing since by Assumption 1 no transition to another state in has positive probability.
The remaining individual, whether A{type or B{type, can now be moved with one mutation to any empty group as an arbitrary type. Continuing this way it is easy to see that all states n 0 2 C v can be reached.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 of Samuelson (1994) .
Corollary Consider two states n; n 0 2 C v : If n is contained in the support of the limit distribution , then so is n 0 .
For the following we need to de ne the notion of 'distance' between two states. Let d(n; n 0 ) = 1 2 P ij j n ij ? n 0 ij j be the distance between n and n 0 . Note that d(n; n 0 ) is the minimum number of individuals that have to change their type or group such that state n becomes state n 0 .
De nition 4 The cost of transition between n and n 0 is given by c(n; n 0 ) = min n 00 fd(n 00 ; n 0 ) j 9m s.t. p m nn 00 (0) > 0g :
Thus the cost of transitions can be interpreted as the minimum number of mutations that is required for the process to move from n to n 0 . Clearly, c(n; n 0 ) = 0 if n can be reached from n 0 via P(0) alone.
Following Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) we will know characterize the limit invariant distribution by graph theoretic methods. Let G(n 0 ; n) denote the set of all directed paths connecting n 0 and n: A path h 2 G(n 0 ; n) is a sequence of states connecting n 0 and n; n (n (0) ; n (1) ); (n (1) ; n (2) ); : : :; (n (z?1) ; n (z) ) o with n 0 = n (0) and n = n (z) : An n{tree H is a directed graph on in which all states other than n are linked to n by exactly one path, n being the sink of this tree. Let H(n) denote the set of all n{trees. Finally, let q n = X H2H(n) Y (n 0 ;n 00 )2H p n 0 n 00 :
The unique invariant distribution can now be characterized as (see Freidlin and Wentzell, 1984, Lemma 3.1) ( ) = ( n ( )) n2 ; with n ( ) = q n P n 0 2 q n 0 (6) By the independence of the mutations, p nn 0 is a polynomial in whose lowest power is the minimal required number of mutations to transfer from n to n 0 , that is, the order of convergence to zero (as ! 0) of this polynomial is given by p nn 0 = O( c(n;n 0 ) ): Therefore, Y (n;n 0 )2H
where C(H) := P (n;n 0 )2H c(n; n 0 ) denotes the cost of a tree H which is calculated as the sum of the required mutations in that tree. Finally, the order of q n is given by the cost of the tree that requires the minimal number of mutations.
q n = O( y(n) ); where y(n) := min
If there were a state n whose q n converged slower to zero than that of all other states as ! 0, one could then following Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) conclude that this state would be observed almost always in the long run. However, here we are not interested in the average time the process spends in a particular state but rather in the average time the process spends in the classes of states, C v :
We can simplify the problem by restricting attention to the states contained in X, that is, to the set of all absorbing states: We can do this because the process de ned on X is again a Markov process and because all states not in X are transient and therefore do not appear in the support of the limit distribution : 19 Formally, de ne the new Markov process (X ; e P) on the restricted state space X with transition matrix e P by setting x t = n (t) , where (t) denotes the period in which ( ; P) is at time for t th time in set X. As Lemma 5 If a class C v 0 is an A{neighbor of some class C v C 0 ; then no absorbing state contained in C v 0 is in the support of the limit distribution : Proof We will prove the lemma by showing that for each absorbing state x 2 C v 0 ; there exists another absorbing state x 0 2 C v such that the minimum cost x{tree has strictly higher cost than the minimum cost x 0 {tree. Due to the characterization given by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) (see our equation 6) q x and consequently x are of strictly lower order than q x 0 and x 0 , respectively. It follows immediately that x 0 will be observed in nitely more often than x; as ?! 0:
First, note that c(x; e x) 2; 8x 2 C v ; e x = 2 C v : This follows because to leave a component in C 0 one must either change an F{group into an empty or an A{group, or populate a sofar empty group. As was shown in Lemma 4 either operation costs at least 2 mutations.
Next, since C v 0 is an A{neighbor, there is some x 0 2 C v 0 such that one mutation is su cient to reach some x 0 2 C v : Consider a minimum{cost x 0 {tree. Let (x; e x); x 2 C v ; e x = 2 C v ; be the edge on the path from x 0 to x 0 that leaves C v for the rst time. Delete this edge and add instead the edge (x 0 ; x 0 ): To complete the tree change the direction of all arrows on the path connecting x 0 with x; which by Lemma 4 does not change the cost of this path. Since c(x; e x) 2 and c(x 0 ; x 0 ) = 1; we have constructed a x 0 -tree with lower cost.
Consequently, x 0 is not in the support of the limit distribution . Due to the above Corollary this holds for all x 2 C v 0 .
With this as preparation we are now ready to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and for arbitrary initial conditions the fair o er F followed by acceptance through the responder will be observed almost always in the long run as ! 0: Proof By Lemma 1 all long run states belong to some absorbing set of P(0).
Due to Lemma 3 all absorbing sets are singletons, which can be partitioned into the classes C v (Lemma 4). And nally, Lemma 5 shows that no absorbing state which belongs to a component that is an A{neighbor of some class in C 0 is contained in the support of the limit distribution.
What remains to be shown is that the absorbing states of no other class besides the ones contained in C 0 belong to the support of : For this consider the A-neighbors v 00 of v 0 , where v 0 is again an A{neighbor of a class in C 0 and suppose that some x 00 2 C v 00 is contained in the support of . Since c(x 00 ; x 0 ) = 1; for some x 00 2 C v 00 ; x 0 2 C v 0 ; we can construct a x 0 {tree from a minimum{cost x 00 {tree with the same cost by deleting the edge (x 0 ; e x) from the x 00 {tree and adding instead the edge (x 00 ; x 0 ). Thus, for x 00 being in the support of it is a necessary condition that x 0 is in the support of . In light of Lemma 5 this is impossible. Repeating this argument we see that only states in C 0 can be in the support of since all absorbing states in C n C 0 are the A{neighbors of some A{neighbors of some A{neighbors : : : of a class in C 0 .
Finally consider the set of trivial absorbing states T : Suppose rst that x 2 T is absorbing because there is one group with N ?1 members and that the remaining individual is of type j. One mutation can put an additional j{type into the small group which yields a regular absorbing state. By the above argument x cannot be in the support of . Now consider a x 2 T in which all groups consists of a single member. One mutation creates a group whose two members receive higher payo s than anybody else. From there an absorbing state in which N ?1 members are in one group can be reached costlessly:
